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Abstract
Suppose a bidder must decide whether and when to incur the cost of
estimating his own private value in an auction. This can explain why a bidder
might increase his bid ceiling in the course of an auction, and why a bidder
would like to know the private values of other bidders. It also can explain
sniping— ﬂurries of bids at the end of auctions with deadlines— as the result of
other bidders trying to avoid stimulating the uninformed bidder to examine
his value.
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Economy for their hospitality.Jeﬀ happily awaited the end of the Ebay auction. He’d submitted
a bid ceiling of $2,100 for a custom-made analog stereo ampliﬁer, and
the highest anybody else had submitted was $1,400, so he was sure
to win. Since he’d followed the advice of Ebay and academic auction
theory, submitting his true maximum price, he looked forward to a
cool $700 in consumer surplus. It was ﬁve minutes before the auction
deadline. And then disaster struck. The winning bid rose to $1,800,
and then $1, 900, and $2,000. And then it rose to $2,150, and Jeﬀ was
losing! Worse yet, as he feverishly thought hard about how much the
ampliﬁer was worth to him, he realized he actually would have been
willing to pay $2,500. But by then it was too late. The auction was
over.1
1. Introduction
In a private-value auction, the value to each bidder of the object being
auctioned is independent of the value to every other bidder. The bidders still
ultimately care about each other’s values, since that will turn out to aﬀect
how much they have to pay to win, but other bidder’s values do not convey
any new information about one’s own valuation. In the standard ascending
auction, in fact, although a bidder would prefer that the other bidders all
have low private values so he could win at a lower price, he would have no
use to make of information about their values in deciding his own bidding
strategy. This is in contrast to common value auctions, in which a bidder
does learn something about his own value when he learns how much someone
else would pay.
Auction theory begins with private-value auctions because a player’s
strategy is simpler. He does not have to worry about using information from
the other players’ bids to estimate the maximum amount he would be willing
to pay for the objection being auctioned. Rather, his problem is just to ﬁgure
out how to minimize the amount he pays while still winning the item if the
winning bid is less than his personal value. In practice, however, private-
1From a story related to me by my law school colleague, Jeﬀrey Stake. I have taken
artistic license with details.
2value auctions can be even more diﬃcult for the bidder than common-value
auctions. This is for an “engineering reason” absent from our models: bidders
do not costlessly know their private values. Whether we think of the problem
as learning one’s preferences or learning about the item being auctioned, the
bidder can only discover his private value at some cost. In a business auction
such as a corporate takeover, the bidder may well spend millions of dollars
to learn the synergies between his own company and the target company.
In a consumption auction such an estate sale, the bidder must scratch his
head and agonize over whether the handsome old table will really go with
his other furnishings at home.
Fortunately, the bidder in an ascending private-value auction usually
does not need to ﬁgure out the exact value of the item to himself. It is
suﬃcient to ﬁgure out that his value is probably higher than that of the
second-highest bidder in the crowd. This is why bidding in second-price
private-value auctions is so easy. Under tight competition, however, even
ﬁguring out whether one’s value is the highest in the crowd is hard. “Value
discovery”, as I shall call it,becomes an important part of the problem and
explain a number of odd features we observe in real-world auctions:
1. Why bidders would like to know how much other bidders are going to
bid.
2. How other bidders can beneﬁt when an uninformed bidder learns his
value more precisely.
3. How improved buyer information on the value of the object can hurt
the seller.
4. Why bidders update the bid ceilings they submit during the course of
a na u c t i o ns u c ha st h o s eo nE b a ya n dA m a z o nt h a tu s e sp r o x yb i d d i n g .
5. Why bidders use “pre-emptive bids”, bidding early in auctions rather
than later.
6. Why bidders use “sniping”– the practice of submitting bids at the last
minute.
3Value discovery is not the only way to explain such things as updating of
bids, pre-emptive bids, and sniping. For explaining pre-emptive bids, value
discovery will merely repeat in a new context the well-known explanation that
entry costs-including the cost of valuing the object— can make pre-emptive
bids valuable (Michael Fishman [1988], David Hirshleifer & Ivan Png [1989]).
A variety of papers try to explain sniping, based on common values (Patrick
Bajari & Ali Hortacsu [2000]), uncertainty over whether late bids will be
registered by the auctioneer (Alvin Roth and Axel Ockenfels [2001]), and
irrationality (Deepak Malhotra & Keith Murnighan [2000]). And the cost of
returning to bid in an auction that takes place over several days has been
shown by Octavian Carare and Michael Rothkopf (2001) to make open-cry
Dutch private auctions not equivalent to sealed-bid auctions. Value discovery
is a simple idea, however, with wide application, which ﬁts certain situations
particularly well and which can explain a wide range of phenomena.
The idea of value discovery has some similarity to the idea of entry fees
in auctions. In the model of Dan Levin and James Smith (1994) bidders
simultaneously decide whether to pay a certain amount to learn their private
values and enter the auction. Levin and Smith calculate how many bidders
w i l le n t e ra n dc o m p a r ei tw i t hw h a ti sb e s tf o re ﬃciency and the seller.
In the present paper, discovery will occur during the auction, raising the
opportunity for strategic behavior by other bidders. Roland Guzman and
Charles Kolstad (1999) also construct a model of a private-value auction
with possible information acquisition, but since they look at a sealed-bid
auction, timing is unimportant. In a diﬀerent style, Nicola Persico (2000)
has studied the eﬃciency of incentives to acquire information, and shows that
with independent private values the Vickrey mechanism is eﬃcient.2
The closest model to the present one is that of Oliver Compte and
Philippe Jehiel (2000), who compare ascending and second-price sealed- bid
private-value auctions when there are n bidders and one of them can acquire
information on his value during the course of the auction. The diﬀerence from
the current paper is that they focus on the eﬀect of the number of bidders
2Information acquisition in common value auctions is a separate topic, since it has a
public good aspect. See Donald Hausch and Lode Li (1993) for such a model.
4and compare expected welfare and revenue from the two types of auction
rules, and they do not consider the “hard” and “soft” ending rules that
we will examine below. They also do not require any time elapse between
the decision to discover the value and the completion of the discovery, an
assumption which can be very important in ascending auctions.
In another stream of research is the model of Kent Daniel and David
Hirshleifer (1998). Extending the entry-cost idea of Fishman and Hirshleifer-
Png, they tell a story in which each bid is costly in a private-value auction
and this leads to a series of jump bids, rather than just a pre-emptive bid at
the start. This is because as the auction proceeds, information is revealed,
and one bidder’s use of a jump bid to signal his high valuation may lead to
another bidder doing the same. In their model, bids do stimulate discontin-
uous behavior, as will the model of the present paper, but each player knows
his own valuation, so what the pre-empting player is trying to do is to show
the other player that the pre-empting player’s valuation is high so as to make
him give up on winning.3
I will proceed by laying out a model of value discovery (Section 2),
which I will analyze under three sets of auction rules, starting with a second-
price sealed-bid auction in order to most simply show the tradeoﬀsi n v o l v e d
(Section 3). I will then lay out the equilibria of two kinds of open auctions,
the Amazon and Ebay auctions (Section 4) and conclude (Section 5).
2. The Model
The two players in an auction are both risk-advtral and have private val-
ues which are statistically independent and distributed over the same support
[0,u], on which the densities are strictly positive. Bidder 1 (the “uninformed”
bidder) has value u1 distributed according to the atomless and diﬀerentiable
density f(u1). Bidder 2 (the “informed” bidder) has value u2 distributed
3Another stream of research, quite diﬀerent from this one but perhaps easily confused
is where the asymmetric information in a private-value auction concerns the number of
bidders, which one bidder may or may not be able to ascertain at a cost. See Kenneth
Burdett and Kenneth Judd (1983), R. Preston McAfee and John Macmillan (1987), and
Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggins (2000) for such models.
5according to the atomless and diﬀerentiable density g(u2). Bidder 1 knows
neither u1 nor u2. At any time he may, unobserved by Bidder 2, pay c and
learn u1 after additional time δ has passed.4 Bidder 2 knows u2, but not u1.
The model is designed to address a situation in which one bidder is
uncertain about (a) his value and (b) whether some other bidder has a higher
value. This bidder’s decision whether to discover his value is the driving force
of the model.
Bidder 1 cannot discover his value instantaneously. Discovery takes time
as well as money. This introduces a tradeoﬀ between discovering early, which
is costly and perhaps will turn out to be wasted eﬀort, and not discovering—
s i n c et h e r ei sn o tt i m et od i s c o v e rl a t ei nt h ea u c t i o n . T h es a m et r a d e o ﬀ
would be present if instantaneous discovery was possible but the cost of
discovery rose with its speed.
3. The Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
In the sealed-bid second-price auction, each player submits one “bid
ceiling”, without knowing what the other has done. Whoever submits the
highest bid ceiling wins the auction, but pays the bid ceiling submitted by
t h eo t h e rp l a y e r ,o rz e r oi ft h eo t h e rp l a y e rc h o s en o tt op a r t i c i p a t e . 5
3a. Bidding Strategies
Equilibrium.6 Bidder 1 pays to discover his value and submits a bid ceiling of
4The assumption that Bidder 2 does not observe Bidder 1’s payment of c is made for
simplicity, not to drive results. If it were not made, then we would have to specify out-of-
equilibrium beliefs for Bidder 2 about Bidder 1’s type if he were to deviate and irrationally
choose to pay c at the wrong time.
5I do not allow the seller to post a reserve price, even though he might proﬁtb yu s i n g
one under certain speciﬁcations of f(u1)a n dg(u2). This allows the analysis to keep its
focus on buyer behavior without imposing tighter conditions on the value distributions.
6I use “equilibrium” to mean perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Second-price sealed-bid
auctions do have equilibria other than the one described here, but they are perverse ones
in which players use weakly dominated strategies. Consider a private-value auction with
two bidders, A and B. When it is common knowledge that Bidder A will win a second-
6u1 if c is suﬃciently low. Otherwise, he submits a bid ceiling of Eu1.B i d d e r
2 submits a bid ceiling of u2.
Bidder 1’s Bidding Strategy. First, suppose Bidder 1 has paid c and discov-
ered his value, u1. Once Bidder 1 knows u1, if Bidder 2 submits a bid ceiling




(u1 − p)m(p)dp. (1)
Maximizing by choice of b yields (u1−b)m(b)=0 ,s ob∗ = u. Bidder 1 should
bid his value, u1.
Second, suppose Bidder 1 has not discovered his value. His payoﬀ if he
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0 u1f(u1)du1, the expected value of u1. Bidder 1 should bid his
expected value.
Bidder 2’s Bidding Strategy. Bidder 2’s payoﬀ if he submits a bid ceiling of




(u2 − p)m(p)dp, (5)
price auction, he is willing to bid higher than his value, vA, and Bidder B is willing to bid
less than vB.T h a tw i l la l s ob et r u ei nt h eE b a ya n dA m a z o na u c t i o n st ob ec o n s i d e r e d
here. Thus, if vA =3a n dvB =1 0 , one Nash equilibrium in the second-price auction is
for Bidder A to bid 100 and Bidder B to bid 0. These strategies are weakly dominated,
however. Bidder A would do no worse with a bid of 3 and would do better if Bidder B bid
90. Bidder B would do no worse with a bid of 10, and would do better if Bidder A bid 9.
I will thus ignore these perverse equilibria.
7because Bidder 2 wins the value u2 and pays the price p if his bid of b exceeds
Bidder 1’s bid of p, and otherwise his payoﬀ is zero. Maximizing his payoﬀ
by choice of b yields
(u2 − b)m(b)=0 , (6)
so b∗ = u2. Bidder 2 should bid his value.
83b. Bidder 1’s Decision of Whether to Pay to Discover His Value
Let us now turn to Bidder 1’s decision of whether to pay to discover
his value. Denote his expected payoﬀ at the start of the game from the
strategy of paying to discover his value by πd
1 and his expected payoﬀ from
the strategy of not paying to discover his value by πnd
1 .
First, suppose Bidder 1 chooses the strategy of paying c to discover his
value, u1.H i sp a y o ﬀ will be either −c,i fu1 <u 2 and he loses the auction, or
−c+u1−u2, if he wins the auction. Bidder 1 does not know Bidder 2’s value,
u2, but we can nonetheless calculate Bidder 1’s expected payoﬀ conditional
upon u2. For given Bidder 2 value u2, Bidder 1’s expected payoﬀ before he









(u1 − u2)f(u1)du1. (7)
The second term, which equals zero, arises because Bidder 1 loses the auction
if u1 <u 2. The third term, which is positive because u1 ranges between values
of u2 and z in the integral, arises because he wins if u1 >u 2.
For high enough values of u2, πd
1(u2) < πnd
1 : Bidder 1’s payoﬀ from
paying c to learn his value is less than his payoﬀ from not paying c (and in
fact πd
1(u2) < 0 for large enough u2). This is because the third term of πd
1(u2)
shrinks to zero as u2 increases: for large u2, there is little chance Bidder 1
will want to overbid Bidder 2. Thus we obtain Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: Bidder 1 beneﬁts from knowing Bidder 2’s value; if c is low
enough, Bidder 1’s expected payoﬀ is higher if he learns u2 before deciding
whether to learn u1.
Bidder 1 beneﬁts from learning u2 in two ways. First, if πd
1 > πnd
1 ,
Bidder 1 would switch from always paying to discover his value to paying
only if πd
1(u2) > πnd
1 .S e c o n d ,i fπd
1 < πnd
1 ,B i d d e r1w o u l ds w i t c hf r o mn e v e r
discovering his value to discovering it if πd
1(u2) > πnd
1 .I f c is suﬃciently
high, however, then knowing u2 is useless to Bidder 1, because for every u2,
πd
1(u2) < πnd
1 . In that situation, Bidder 1 would never pay to discover u1
even if he knew u2.
9In the standard private-value second-price auction model, knowing the
values, or even the bids of other bidders is unhelpful, because the knowledge
would not aﬀect one’s strategy.7 I t su s e f u l n e s sh e r ei st h a ti td o e sa ﬀect his
decision about learning his own value more precisely.
Let us now return to deriving Bidder 1’s expected payoﬀ for the strategy
of paying to discover his value when he does not know u2. Integrating over
all possible values of u2 yields an overall expected payoﬀ of
π
d








For comparison with his payoﬀ when he does not acquire information, it will
be useful to divide the integral in this payoﬀ into two parts, depending on
whether u2 is less than Eu1 or greater, and represent them by A1 and A2.
Both A1 and A2 are positive, since both represent situations in which Bidder
1 wins the auction at a price less than his value.
πd















= −c + A1 + A2.
(9)
Now let us ﬁnd Bidder 1’s payoﬀ if he does not learn u1. He will bid Eu1.
If Eu1 <u 2, he will lose the auction and his payoﬀ will be zero: πnd
1 (u2)=0 .
If Eu1 >u 2, he will win, and his payoﬀ will be u1 − u2. Integrating over







(u1 − u2)f(u1)du1 +
] u
u2
(u1 − u2)f(u1)du1. (10)
The ﬁrst integral is negative, because Bidder 1 is winning the auction and
paying u2 when u1 <u 2. The second integral is positive, because u1 >u 2.
7This is not true in all models. Jeitschko (1998) models a sequential ﬁrst-price sealed-
bid auction in which bidders have either high or low private values, so that ties are likely.
The equilibrium is in mixed strategies, and knowing the values of one’s rivals is helpful in
deciding one’s bid.
10Integrating πnd































= −A3 + A1,
(11)
where A1 is the same integral A1 as in expression (9). The term −A3 is
negative because it represents the outcomes in which Bidder 1 has won and
paid u2 >u 1.
These results illustrate the beneﬁts of information. If c is too large, then
πd
1 < 0, and value discovery is inferior to non-discovery. If c is small enough,
however, it is worthwhile to pay it to discover u1. This is true because Bidder
1’s expected payoﬀ from discovering his value is πd
1 = −c + A1 + A2,w h i l e
if he does not discover his value it is πnd
1 − A3 + A1.I f c is small enough,
discovery has the higher expected payoﬀ because it includes the beneﬁt A2
and avoids the cost −A3.
All three terms have intuitive meanings. Term A1, present in both
πd
1 and πnd
1 , is the payoﬀ from winning proﬁtably when u2 takes the low
values between zero and Eu1. The strategy of discovery adds term A2,t h e
payoﬀ from winning proﬁtably when u2 t a k e sv a l u e sh i g h e rt h a nEu1 (values
which still have some probability of being less than Bidder 1’s value, u1).
The strategy of non-discovery incurs the extra cost, −A3, the payoﬀ from
winning unproﬁtably when u2 takes low values between zero and Eu1.T h u s ,
discovery has the two beneﬁts of winning proﬁtably more often, and of never
winning unproﬁtably.
Thus, Bidder 1 will pay to discover his value if c is low enough, and
otherwise not pay, as asserted in the proposed equilibrium.
3c. Value Discovery and the Payoﬀs of Bidder 2 and the Seller
11So far we discussed the value of information to Bidder 1. We know
that Bidder 1 beneﬁts from knowing his value. How does Bidder 1’s value
discovery aﬀect the payoﬀs of the Bidder 2 and the seller? This is addressed
by Propositions 2 and 3, which apply not only to the second-price sealed-bid
auction but to all three auction rules.
Proposition 2: The expected payoﬀ of the informed bidder (Bidder 2) is
higher if the uninformed bidder (Bidder 1) knows u1 at the start of the auc-
tion.
Proof: First, suppose u2 <E u 1. Bidder 2’s payoﬀ is zero without value
discovery, because Bidder 1 will bid Eu1 and win. Bidder 2’s payoﬀ is positive
with value discovery, because there is probability F(u2)t h a tu1 will be less
than u2 and Bidder 1 will win. Thus, if u2 <E u 1, Bidder 2 beneﬁts from
Bidder 1 knowing u1.
Second, suppose u2 ≥ Eu1. Without value discovery, Bidder 2’s payoﬀ is
u2 − Eu1, (12)





















We need to show that (13), Bidder 2’s payoﬀ when Bidder 1 does not discover
his value, is less than (14), Bidder 2’s payoﬀ when Bidder 1 does discover his




















12which is true because in the right-hand-side integral u1 is taking values that
are u2 or greater.
Hence, Bidder 2 beneﬁts from Bidder 1’s value discovery at the start of
the auction, which was to be shown.8
When Bidder 1 knows his value, there is a gain in total surplus, because
the auction becomes eﬃcient; whichever bidder has the higher value wins the
auction. Bidder 1 would beneﬁtf r o mk n o w i n gu1 at zero cost, as shown in
Section 3b, and we have just seen from Proposition 2 that Bidder 2 beneﬁts
from Bidder 1 knowing u1. Since there is an eﬃciency gain, it is also possible
that the seller gains from improved information about the value of his good
to Bidder 1. Proposition 3 says that this turns out not to be the case.
Proposition 3: The seller can prefer that a bidder (Bidder 1 here) not know
his value precisely at the start of the auction.
Proof: Take a given u2. First, suppose u2 <E u 1. The winning price would
be u2. Value discovery will either keep the winning price at u2 (if u1 ≥ u2),
or reduce it to below u2 (if u1 <u 2). Thus, the expected winning price is
higher if Bidder 1 does not know u1.
Second, suppose u2 ≥ Eu1. The winning price would be Eu1 if Bid-
der 1 does not know u1. Value discovery will change the winning price to


















8I include the caveat “at the start of the auction” because in the Amazon and Ebay
auctions value discovery may occur later, with diﬀerent results for the informed bidder
and the seller.






which is true since in the second integral u1 ranges from u2 up to u whereas
in the ﬁrst integral u2 is a constant.
Thus, the winning price falls with value discovery for any given value of
u2, which was to be shown.
Proposition 3 is in striking contrast to the conventional wisdom about
auctions, which is that the seller shou l dd oe v e r y t h i n gp o s s i b l et oi m p r o v e
information about the object’s value (see Milgrom and Weber [1982], or,
for a recent elaboration showing how a seller might strategically manipulate
information, Kaplan and Zamir [2000]). That conventional wisdom is, of
course, true in its proper context. In a common value auction, the better
the information, the less acute is the winner’s curse. Moreover, if buyers
are risk averse, whether in a private value auction or a common value one,
then reducing the uncertainty they have over the object’s value increases their
willingness to bid. And as recent work by Lixin Ye (2001a, 2001b) has shown,
if bidders must bear an entry cost prior to participating in the auction, then
the seller should take into account the eﬀect of improved information on how
many bidders will enter. Indeed, the seller may wish to use an “indicative
bidding” round prior to the main auction, constructed so that bidders will
reveal something of their values to each other.
In the present model, however, none of these considerations apply. In-
stead, the expected price falls when the bidders knows his private value bet-
ter. The average bid ceiling submitted by Bidder 1 is Eu1 whether he knows
his value or not. If he does not know his value, however, his bid ceiling is
always Eu1 with certainty, whereas if he does know his value, his bid ceiling
has greater variation and the expectation of the minimum of his bid ceiling
and Bidder 2’s bid ceiling becomes smaller.
The result here is also a point of diﬀerence between the present paper
and the model of Compte and Jehiel (2000), who ﬁnd that if the number
14of bidders is large enough and the discovery cost is small enough, then the
seller’s revenue is higher in an ascending auction (in which information is re-
vealed in the course of the auction) than in a second-price sealed-bid auction.
An interesting feature of their model is that an uninformed bidder should not
p a yt od i s c o v e rh i sv a l u es ol o n ga sa tl e a s tt w oo t h e rb i d d e r sa r ea c t i v ei n
the bidding– which means that he will remain in the auction even after the
price has exceeded his expected value, because he may decide later (instan-
taneously) to pay to discover his value. If there are many other bidders, the
uninformed bidder is unlikely to have the highest value, and so runs little risk
of winning at a low price and later discovering that his value is even lower.
Rather, if he discovers his value, it is likely to be after the winning bid has
exceeded his expected value, and so the eﬀect of value discovery is to raise
his bid rather than to lower it. This points to an important diﬀerence in the
eﬀects of value discovery on seller incentives when there are many instead of
few bidders, and when the uninformed bidder is unlikely instead of likely to
be the winner.
4. Open-Cry Auctions
We will now look at open-cry auctions, in which the bidders can make
deductions about each other’s values in the course of the auction by observing
the bidding.
The Amazon auction uses “proxy bidding”. Each player submits a “bid
ceiling”. The “current winner” is the player with the highest bid ceiling, who
if nobody revised bid ceilings would win the auction and pay the second-
highest bid ceiling, the “current winning bid” (which is set at 0 at the start
of the auction). The auctioneer publicly posts the current winning bid, but
not the bid ceilings. At any time, a player can increase his bid ceiling, but he
cannot reduce it. The auction ends either at time T,o rN minutes after the
last bid ceiling revision, whichever is later, with N>δ,s ot h e r ei ss t i l lt i m e
for value discovery. Thus, the auction has a “soft deadline.” The current
winner becomes the winner and pays the current winning bid. If there is a
tie, then the current winners have equal probabilities of becoming the winner.
15The Ebay auction also uses proxy bidding. It is the same as the Amazon
auction except that the auction ends at time T regardless of when the last
bid ceiling revision took place. Thus, the auction has a “hard deadline.”
4a. The Amazon Auction
Because the Amazon auction has a soft deadline, Bidder 1 always has
time to discover his value before he must respond to Bidder 2’s bids.
Equilibrium. Bidder 1 submits a bid ceiling of either Eu1,i fc is high enough,
or p>0 otherwise. If he has submitted a bid ceiling of p and the current
winning bid rises to p,h ep a y sc to discover u1 a n dt h e ni n c r e a s e sh i sb i d
ceiling to u1 if u1 > p. Bidder 2 submits a bid ceiling of u2.
Explanation. In the Amazon auction, as in the second-price sealed bid auc-
tion, the winner is the bidder with the highest bid ceiling and the price equals
the second-highest bid ceiling. Thus,the only diﬀerence is that the bidders
can extract information by observing the current winning bid.
It will be convenient to discuss Bidder 2’s strategy ﬁrst. For the same
reasons as in the second-price sealed-bid auction, Bidder 2 will want to have
submitted a bid ceiling of u2 by the end of the auction at time T:b i d d i n g
less than u2, he would lose when he could proﬁtably win while not reducing
the price he paid; bidding more than u2 he might win at a price greater than
his value. The only question is whether Bidder 2 could beneﬁtf r o mc h o o s i n g
the timing of his bid so as to aﬀect Bidder 1’s value discovery decision. In the
Amazon auction, Bidder 2 cannot so beneﬁt. Whether Bidder 2 submits a bid
ceiling of p early in the auction or late, Bidder 1 has time for value discovery,
because when Bidder 2 submits such a bid ceiling the current winning bid
increases and the soft deadline means that a time interval of at least N>δ
remains in the auction. Thus, Bidder 2 submits a bid ceiling of u2 at any
time before T.
F o rt h es a m er e a s o n sa si nt h es e c o n d -price sealed-bid auction, Bidder
1’s optimal bid ceiling at the end of the auction is u1 if he knows u1 and Eu1
16otherwise. If Bidder 1 chooses the policy of submitting a bid ceiling of Eu1
and never paying to discover u1, his expected payoﬀ is identical to equation
(10), its value in the second-price sealed-bid auction. Just as in that auction,
he wins at the price of u2 if u2 <E u 1 and loses if u2 >E u 1.
If Bidder 1 chooses the policy of submitting a bid ceiling of p,h i se x -
pected payoﬀ is diﬀerent. Let us again construct a πd
1(u2) function, now for
the strategy of discovering u1 if the current winning bid reaches p.I fu2 < p,






(u1 − u2)f(u1)du1. (20)









(u1 − u2)f(u1)du1. (21)
Integrating over the possible values of u2 yields an overall expected pay-





















If p = 0, Bidder 1 pays to discover u1 immediately as the auction starts.
The ﬁrst term of payoﬀ (22) equals zero, leaving the payoﬀ identical to equa-
tion (8), the same as in the second-price sealed-bid auction for the policy of
discovering u1. Thus, our results from the second-price sealed-bid auction
tell us immediately that πd
1 > πnd
1 if c is low enough but not otherwise. All
that remains to be shown is that he will choose p>0, a strategy in which
he discovers u1 only if the current winning bid rises above zero.
Lemma: Bidder 1 will set his initial bid ceiling to be strictly positive, delay-
ing value discovery: p>0.
Proof: Diﬀerentiating Bidder 1’s payoﬀ with respect to p (which we can do
















If p =0 ,t h eﬁrst and third terms of this derivative cancel out. The second
term is positive, however, given our assumption that the value density is
everywhere positive. Thus the payoﬀ derivative is positive at p =0 ,i nw h i c h
c a s et h eo p t i m a lv a l u eo fp is positive, which was to be proved.
There is an intuitive explanation for this result. The advantage of in-
creasing p is that possibly the bidder will win at a price p<p and not
have to pay the discovery cost c. The disadvantage of increasing p is that
possibly the bidder will win at a price p<p such that p exceeds his value:
p = u2 >u 1, something which value discovery would have prevented. The
size of this disadvantage depends on the likelihood that Bidder 1’s value is
below p,w h i c hi s
U p
0 f(u1)du1.I fp = 0, this disadvantage vanishes; there is
no risk that Bidder 1’s value will be below p. Thus, Bidder 1 should increase
his initial bid ceiling until the marginal gain from avoiding the discovery cost
equals the marginal loss from winning when his value is below the price he
pays.
In the equilibrium of the Amazon auction, Bidder 1 raises his bid ceiling if
it happens that u2 ≥ p. This yields us Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: The phenomenon of bidders increasing their bid ceilings
during the auction can be a necessary part of equilibrium.
Without value discovery, a bidder has no incentive to wait to submit his
true value as his bid ceiling, rather than submit it at the start of the auction.
In the present model, that would be true if the bidder either knew u1 at the
s t a r to ri fh ec o u l dn o ts p e n dc to discover u1. Here, however, a bidder can
ﬁnd it strictly superior to delay in the hope of not having to pay the cost of
value discovery, but then to pay it and revise his bid ceiling if he ﬁnds that
18bidding is competitive enough.9
Proposition 4 could arise in another way, not present in this model,
but true to its spirit: via exogenous changes in a bidder’s value discovered
by him immediately at zero cost. A rational bidder will take into account
the possibility of random shocks in his value when he ﬁrst submits his bid
ceiling, and it provides an incentive to submit the ceiling as late as possible.
If, however, there is an extra cost to submitting one’s ﬁrst bid ceiling late
instead of early (because the bidder is already at the website early in the
game but must make a special trip to return later, for example), a bidder
might take the risk of submitting early. This could explain not only upward
revisions in bid ceilings, but downward ones, if they were permitted. As the
Wall Street Journal explains:
“... on all the major sites you must submit your maximum
bid up front, and you’re obliged to pay it if bidding gets that
high and doesn’t go higher, even if you’ve lost interest in an item
during the course of the auction.”10
4b. The Ebay Auction
The Ebay auction is identical to the Amazon auction except that it
has a hard deadline: bid ceilings cannot be updated after time T regardless
of when the current winning bid last increased. This means that Bidder 1
cannot discover his value in response to bids observed after time T − δ.
Equilibrium. If c is low enough, Bidder 1 submits a bid ceiling of b before
time T − δ, and then pays to discover his value if the current winning bid
reaches b. If the current winning bid does not reach b,h er a i s e sh i sb i d
ceiling to Eu1.I fc is higher, Bidder 1 submits a bid ceiling of Eu1 and never
9I explore this point further in Rasmusen (2002), where I use it to explain the phe-
nomenon of bidders apparently getting “carried away” in auctions.
10“As eBay Rivals Emerge, Some Tips on Bidding And Selling on the Web,” Wall Street
Journal, Bart Ziegler, September 23, 1999, p. B1.
19discovers his value. Bidder 2 submits a bid ceiling of b before time T − δ,
and raises his bid ceiling to u2 after time T − δ.
Explanation. F o rt h es a m er e a s o n sa si nt h eﬁr s tt w oa u c t i o nr u l e s ,i nt h e
Ebay auction Bidder 1’s bid ceiling by the end of the auction will be u1 if he
knows it and Eu1 otherwise, and Bidder 2’s bid ceiling will be u2.T h eo n l y
questions are whether Bidder 1 wants to submit a lower bid ceiling in order
to learn something about Bidder 2’s value, and whether Bidder 2 is willing
t oa c ts oa st or e v e a lh i sv a l u e .
The Ebay auction has introduced a new complication. Now Bidder 2 can
wait to bid until after T −δ and prevent value discovery. Whether Bidder 2
wants to do this depends on whether he wants to provoke Bidder 1 to discover
u1. If Bidder 2 has value u2 and provokes value discovery by submitting a bid
ceiling of b or more, his expected payoﬀ is made up of three parts, depending




(u2 − b)f(u1)du1 +
] u2
b




This payoﬀ is declining in b, since its derivative is
dπ2
db
=( u2 − b)f(b) −
] b
0
f(u1)du1 +( u2 − b)f(b). (25)
Intuitively, if b is greater, then Bidder 2 beneﬁts less from Bidder 1 learning
u1 because Bidder 1 cannot reduce his bid ceiling below b after learning that
u<b.
If b = 0, expression (24) becomes identical to Bidder 2’s payoﬀ when
Bidder 1 discovers u1 at the start of the auction, the value found earlier in
equation (14). We can deduce from Proposition 2 that there is some positive
value of b low enough that Bidder 2 will beneﬁt from value discovery, since
if b = 0, Proposition 2 tells us that Bidder 2 beneﬁts from value discovery.
L e tu sc a l lt h a tc r i t i c a lv a l u ek.
In choosing a discovery threshold, b, Bidder 1 is constrained to set b ≤ k,
because otherwise Bidder 2 would want to avoid provoking value discovery
20and would delay submitting u2 as his bid ceiling until after T − δ.T h u s ,b
will be less than or equal to the p of the Amazon auction. If c is too high,
then Bidder 1 will prefer not to discover his value and to simply bid Eu1 at
the start of the auction.
In the equilibrium of the Ebay auction, it is important for Bidder 2 to submit
a bid ceiling of at least b before time (T − δ) if he wishes to provoke value
discovery. This yields us Proposition 5.
Proposition 5: A bidder may purposely bid early, so as to stimulate value
discovery.
Proposition 5 stands in contrast to the standard private-value auction
model, in which the timing of bids is unimportant. If there were no value
discovery in the model— or if value discovery could occur at any time, as in
the Amazon auction— then it would make no diﬀerence whether Bidder 2 bid
early or late. In the Ebay auction, however, it is important that Bidder 1
submit the bid ceiling of b before time T −δ, because he wishes to stimulate
value discovery. Bidder 1 has submitted a relatively low bid ceiling, and
Bidder 2 would like him to discover u1 rather than just raise his bid ceiling
to Eu1. Bidder 2 thus makes what looks like a pre-emptive bid, but not for
the usual reason of deterring entry into the auction when there is an entry
cost, but for what is almost the opposite reason: to stimulate another bidder
to buy costly information and perhaps leave the auction as a result. Bidder
2 wishes to alert Bidder 1 that there will be tight competition to buy the
object being sold, so that Bidder 1 will think carefully before he advances
his bid ceiling to Eu1.
Proposition 5 also shows that sniping is not always the optimal strategy–
indeed, in this version of the model, it is never an optimal strategy. It has
been noted that if there is a common value component to the value, then a
bidder ought to bid as late as possible, in order to prevent his rivals from
learning about their values from his bid (see, e.g., p. 369 of Wilcox [2000]).
Here in this private-value setting, however, the eﬀect of bidding early can be
to reduce competition rather than intensify it.
214c. The Equilibrium if Bidder 1 is Naive
Let us call Bidder 1 a “naive bidder” if he places zero probability on
Bidder 2 being in the auction and at the start of the auction submits his
expected value Eu1, as his bid ceiling. In such a situation, of course, Bidder
1 expects to win at a price of zero (since he expects no other bids to be
made), so he is indiﬀerent as to his bid ceiling. To submit his expected
value, however, is to follow the advice of auction theory, which says that
submitting one’s private value is a dominant strategy, and is to follow the
advice of the Ebay website instructions, which say:
“For example, if the current bid on an item is $5 and you are
willing to pay up to $10, you would enter $10 as your maximum bid.
Your bid would be shown on the item page as $5, but if another bid-
der places a bid for $6, then eBay will place a higher bid on your
behalf. The bid would be just above the other member’s bid. This
would continue until either you win the auction at or below $10 or the
bidding exceeds the $10 you were willing to pay. eBay will notify you
via email if you are outbid and you can return to place another bid if
you like. Your maximum bid is never disclosed to other bidders or to
the seller.” – EBay Tutorials, “Place Your Bid”
http://pages.ebay.com/education/tutorial/course1/bidding 3.html (May
25, 2002)
Ronald Wilcox (2000) investigated the pattern of bidding in Ebay auc-
tions for consumer items and found that less experienced bidders submitted
their bids earlier than more experienced bidders; for example, 1.2 percent of
the least experienced bidders bid during the last minute, whereas 8.2 percent
of the most experienced bidders did. This eﬀect was present for both private-
value and common-value goods, though most pronounced for common-value
goods.11
11Wilcox also tried to approch the question of whether less experienced bidders increased
their bids during the course of the auction. This is diﬃcult because the public data does
not say whether a bidder has increased his bid. It does, however, have the total number
22Alvin Roth and Axel Ockenfels (2001, 2002) have also investigated Inter-
net auctions. They ﬁnd that EBay auctions have more sniping than Amazon
auctions– 20 percent of all last Ebay bids are submitted in the last hour,
but only 7 percent of Amazon bids, and that in the last ﬁve minutes 9 and
16 percent (for computers vs. antiques) of Ebay bidders submit their bids
but only 1 percent of Amazon bidders. The diﬀerence is even clearer with
e x p e r i e n c e db i d d e r s :i nt h eE b a ya u c t i o nt h e ys u b m i tb i d sl a t e rt h a nt h e
inexperienced bidders, while on Amazon they submit earlier. They also sur-
veyed bidders who bid in the last minute. Most of the some 70 bidders who
replied said they bid late consciously and to keep prices down. Some said
they were inﬂuenced in their values by the bids of other people, but 88 per-
cent of late bidders said that they had a clear idea of their value at the start
of the auction. A few (less than 10 percent) seem to have been confused
about the auction rule and thought they had to bid late to win.
In the second-price sealed-bid auction, Bidder 2 would still submit a bid
ceiling of u2 if Bidder 1 is naive and bids Eu1. As a result, for low c,t h e
expected price would be higher than when Bidder 1 was not naive. seller.
Bidder 1’s naivete has prevented him from paying c to discover his value, to
the detriment of both bidders and to the advantage of the seller.
In the Amazon auction, if Bidder 1 starts by submitting a bid ceiling of
Eu1, Bidder 2 would also submit a bid ceiling of u2. The current winning
bid would then equal Min(Eu1,u 2), and Bidder 1 would realize that the
probability-zero event of Bidder 2 being present at the auction had occurred.
If the current winning bid were less than Eu1, Bidder 1 would realize that
Eu1 >u 2 and not pay to discover his value. If the current winning bid were
Eu1, Bidder 1 would realize that if he does not discover his value, his payoﬀ
will equal zero because he will lose the auction, but if he does discover his












of bids and bidders. He found no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in number of bids per bidder in
auctions for private-value goods where average experience was higher, but that the number
of bids per bidder was higher for common-value goods.
23Whether this payoﬀ is positive or negative depends on the value of c,s o
Bidder 1 will discover his value if c is small enough and not otherwise. Bidder
2 has no reason to delay submitting a bid ceiling of u2 because under the
Amazon auction rule, Bidder 2 has time N>δ after the current winning bid
rises to Eu1 in which to discover his value. As in the second-price sealed-bid
auction, the expected price is higher when Bidder 1 is naive, to the detriment
of Bidders 1 and 2 and to the beneﬁt of the seller.
Bidder 2 has no reason to delay submitting his bid ceiling of u2 because
under the Amazon auction rule, Bidder 2 has time N>δ after the current
winning bid rises to Eu1 in which to discover his value. He would like to alert
Bidder 1 to his presence before the auction starts, in order to prevent Bidder
1 from starting with a bid ceiling as high as Eu1, but that is not possible.
As in the second-price sealed-bid auction, the expected price is higher when
Bidder 1 is naive, to the detriment of Bidders 1 and 2 and to the beneﬁto f
the seller.
In the Ebay auction, if the naive Bidder 1 would submit a bid ceiling
of Eu1 at the start of the auction, Bidder 2’s best response is slightly more
complicated. If u2 ≤ Eu1, Bidder 2 would submit a bid ceiling of u2 at any
time. If u2 >E u 1, then if expression (26) is positive, Bidder 2 would submit
a bid ceiling of u2 in the time interval [T − δ,T]; if it is negative, he would
submit a bid ceiling of u2 at any time.
The diﬀerence between the Amazon and Ebay auctions is that in the
Ebay auction, Bidder 2 can avoid stimulating Bidder 1’s value discovery.
The diﬀerence between the Ebay auction in Section 4b and the Ebay auction
with the naive bidder is that the naive bidder has bid Eu1,w h i c hi sa b o v e
the critical level k below which Bidder 2 wants to stimulate value discovery.
That Eu1 >kis simple to see. If Bidder 1 discovers u1 after submitting a bid
ceiling of Eu1, either he discovers that u1 <E u 1 and does not change his bid
ceiling, or he discovers that u1 >E u 1 and increases his bid ceiling. When
Bidder 1 increases his bid ceiling, Bidder 2 is hurt, either because Bidder
2 still wins but at the increased price of u1 >E u 1 or because now Bidder
2 loses because u1 >u 2. Thus, Bidder 2 wants to avoid stimulating value
24discovery, which the submission of a bid ceiling of u2 before T − δ would do
if u2 >E u 1 and expression (26) were positive. When Bidder 1 is naive in the
Ebay auction, Bidder 2 will to delay submitting his bid ceiling if u2 >E u 1,
which yields us Proposition 6.
Proposition 6: Sniping can occur in equilibrium. A bidder may purposely
delay submitting a bid ceiling higher than the current winning bid until near
the auction deadline.
Sniping would not occur in a standard private-value auction model, in
which the timing of bids does not matter, because other bidders will not ﬁnd
it useful to learn one’s value. When a bidder is uncertain about his private
value, however, as in the present model, he does beneﬁt from learning other
bidders’ values (Proposition 1) and this can be to their beneﬁt (Proposition
5) or detriment (Proposition 6).
Other Explanations for Sniping
The simplest alternative explanation for sniping is that the auction is
not a private-value auction at all, but a common-value auction, in which
case sniping can easily arise if there is time required for updating valuations.
Since the value is common to all bidders, whenever a bidder raises his bid,
the other bidders will revise their value estimates upwards and bid more, to
his detriment. Hence, he will delay bidding until it is too late for them to
revise their estimates.
This explanation— though, of course, phrased less technically— can be
found with others at the website, “advanced Auction Management,”
http://www.tblightning.com/ebay/auction management.htm (Jan 27, 2002),
which lists other practical reasons for bidding late. One such reason is that a
late bidder does not have to commit early to buy that item only to later ﬁnd
something he would rather buy instead. Closely related is that the late bidder
knows whether he has successfully bought the item quickly, so he can move
on to another source if he loses. Neither of these reasons is a compelling one
for bidding in the last moments of the auction, but the site also mentions one
25that is: “shilling” sellers. Sellers in Internet auctions are strictly forbidden
to bid on their own items, although they may use a pre-set reserve price
if they wish. Otherwise, the seller could see how much the highest-valuing
bidder was willing to pay and turn the auction into a bargaining game to
increase the price. Nonetheless, shilling is hard to catch, because sellers can
use pseudonymous email addresses to bid. If such strategizing by the seller
takes time, however, it can be evaded by bidding close to the deadline. This
is a plausible risk, though it seems unlikely that seller fraud is so rampant
as to explain the level of sniping that we observe.
Alvin Roth and Axel Ockenfels (2001) have a diﬀerent explanation for
sniping. Their model is driven by the possibility that players making bids in
t h el a s tm i n u t em a yﬁnd the computer has not been able to get their bids
in time. In that case, players will submit low bids early in the auction and
higher bids in the last minute. There is some chance that none of the high
bids will be accepted, and so some bidder wins with his very low initial bid.
If, on the other hand, someone tries bidding higher before the last minute, so
his bid deﬁnitely reaches Ebay, he ﬁnds that other bidders will outbid him
and the resulting bidding war will leave even the winner with a low payoﬀ.12
Compte and Jehiel (2000) do not consider sniping in their paper, but
their model could be adapted to explain it in a certain context. They con-
struct a model of an ascending private-value auction in which value discovery
is costly but instantaneous, and they ﬁnd that if there are suﬃciently many
informed bidders, expected seller revenue is higher than in a second-price
sealed-bid auction. As explained above, revenue rises because the uninformed
bidder is unlikely to have the highest value, and will wait until late in the
auction to decide whether to discover his value. Thus, as in the naive bidder
12This has some similarity to Bertrand models of price competition, where marginal-cost
pricing is Nash, but weakly dominated, and so disappears when noise is added. See, for
example, Maarten Janssen & Eric Rasmusen (2001), in which N identical ﬁrms each may
be active or inactive, and post prices for a consumer. Each ﬁr mk n o w st h a ti tm i g h tb et h e
only active ﬁrm, so it charges a price higher than marginal cost, using a mixed strategy. As
in Roth & Ockenfels, a little bit of noise in a Bertrand model (in their case, the possibility
last-minute bids might not get through) results in the competing price setters ending up
with positive expected proﬁts.
26model in the present paper, value discovery will raise his bid, not reduce it.
Suppose, instead, that value discovery requires time and that the auction
is an Ebay auction, with a hard deadline. The informed bidders may then
have incentive to delay until the last few minutes of the auction so that the
uninformed bidder cannot use their bids to decide whether to increase his bid
above his expected value. This explanation applies to when there are many
informed bidders and the uninformed bidder is unlikely to have the high-
est bid; the value discovery model in the current paper applies when there
are few informed bidders and the uninformed bidder has a bigger chance of
having the highest bid.
5. Concluding Remarks
Value discovery explains the ﬂurry of last-minute bidding in internet
auctions as being the result of bidder ignorance of their private values. Some
bidders bid late so as to prevent other bidders from having time to acquire
more precise information on how much they value the object being auctioned.
This also explains repeat bidding: bidders refrain from incurring the cost of
thinking hard about their values until they see that bidding is high enough
that such thinking is necessary.
There is a curious nonmonotonicity in the willingness of the bidder to
pay to discover his private value. If he believes he is almost certain to lose
the auction, he will not bother to discover his value. But if he believes he
is almost certain to win the auction, he also will not bother to discover his
value– for in that case, all that matters is that his bid exceed that of the
second-highest bidder. In between, however, where the bidder is uncertain
about whether he will win or not, it becomes useful to know his value pre-
cisely.
Value discovery may well have useful application to other kinds of mar-
kets. The auction story parallels a bidder’s decision when buying at a posted
price. If he knows that the object’s price is much more than its value to him,
he will not agonize over how much it is worth to him, and similarly if the
price is far less than its value. Only when the price is close to the estimate
27value does it become worthwhile to spend time and energy improving the
estimate. The only diﬀerence is that in an auction the buyer must decide
whether to do his improvement in advance, for fear that the ﬁnal price will
be closer to his estimate than the present one.13
For what kind of auctions is this model reasonable? Certainly it applies
to ascending auctions conducted over a long period of time (e.g., three days),
like the Ebay auctions. It also applies to sequential auctions, like the FCC
Spectrum Auction, in which sealed bids are submitted, the winning bid is
announced, and then other rounds are held till nobody wants to bid higher.
But it even applies to classic English auctions like those at estate sales. The
auction only lasts ﬁve minutes, but bidders must decide beforehand whether
to learn the value, and if they see bidding is low at ﬁrst, they can spend a
minute learning more about their private value and it will not be too late to
enter the auction.
13The idea that ﬁnding out one’s own value for an object explains odd behavior also
shows up in bargaining. In Rasmusen (2001), I model negotiation as a process in which
one player makes oﬀers whose value the other player can determine only at some cost. This
usually results in a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the oﬀers are sometimes high and
sometimes low value, and the ignorant player sometimes investigates before accepting and
sometimes does not.
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